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THE FORMATION AND VIABILITY OF ANTI-STALKING LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
After the 1989 murder of Rebecca Schaeffer, a popular television star,
the crusade for the enactment of anti-stalking laws began.' Today, all fifty
states and the District of Columbia have enacted anti-stalking statutes.
2
1. See Rosalind Resnick, California Takes Lead: States Enact 'Stalking' Laws,
NAT'L L.J., May 11, 1992 at 33. California passed the first and-stalking statute in
1990 after the murders of Rebecca Schaeffer and five other women were attributed
to stalking-type behavior. Id.; see Miles Corwin, When the Law Can't Protect, L.A.
TIMES, May 8, 1993, at Al (recounting stories of four women killed within five week
period). In Schaeffer's case, the murderer had sent her several threatening letters,
followed her on countless occasions, attempted to gain entry into her work place
and hired a private detective to find her address before he shot her to death in the
doorway of her apartment. Id. at Al; see Andrea Ford, Suspect on Tape Tells of Ac-
tress's Last Words, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at B3.
2. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-90 to -94 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.260 to
.270 (Supp. 1994); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (Supp. 1994); ARI. CODE ANN.
§ 5-71-229 (Michie 1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 18-9-111 (Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-181c to -181d (West
Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1994); FL-A. STAT. ANN.
§ 784.048 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-90 to -93 (Supp. 1994); HAw.
REv. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1994); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 to .4 (Smith-Hurd 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-
45-10-1 to -5 (West Supp. 1994); IoWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West Supp. 1994);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3438 (Supp. 1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.130 to .150
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (West Supp.
1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 762 (West Supp. 1994) (including stalking as
part of abuse); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121B (Supp. 1994); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 265, § 43 (West Supp. 1994); MICH. CoMp. LAws §§ 750.411h to .411i (Supp.
1994); MINN. STAT. § 609.749 (Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107 (1994);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220
(1993); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-311.02 to .05 (Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 200.575 (Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 633:3-a (Supp. 1994); N.J. REv.
STAT. § 2C:12-10 (Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3A-1 to -4 (Michie Supp.
1993); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.13-.14, 240.25-.26 (McKinney Supp. 1995) (calling
crime menacing or harassment rather than stalking); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3
(Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 2903.211 to .215 (Anderson Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173 (West
Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.730-32 (Supp. 1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2709(b) (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-59-1 to -3 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-1070 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 22-19A-1 to -7
(Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1994); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 42.07(a)(7) (West 1994) (describing stalking in section entitled harassment);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1061-63
(Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1994); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (Supp. 1994); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 947.013 (West Supp. 1994) (addressing stalking under section enti-
ded harassment); Wvo. STAT. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1994); see also Tamar Lewin, New
Laws Address Old Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1993, at A5 (explaining anti-stalking
laws).
(1387)
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These states designed the statutes to give law enforcement officials a more
meaningful mechanism to protect stalking victims than provided by tradi-
tional civil and criminal remedies.3
Since their inception, however, stalking laws have raised constitu-
tional questions.4 Some state trial courts found stalking laws to be uncon-
stitutionally vague or overly broad.5 Other states criticized anti-stalking
laws for being too narrow or ineffective. 6 In response to the questions
3. See Kenneth R. Thomas, Anti-Stalking Statutes: Background and Constitutional
Analysis, CONG. REs. SERVICE 92-735 A, at 3 (Sept. 26, 1992). It is estimated that "at
least 200,000 people report being stalked by persons who threaten them with vio-
lence, even death." Larry King Live: Stalker, Their Victims, and the Law (CNN televi-
sion broadcast, May 12, 1993). For a discussion of traditional civil remedies to
stalking-type behavior, see infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of traditional criminal remedies for stalking type behavior, see infra notes 31-
40 and accompanying text.
4. Nightline: Anti-Stalker Laws (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 3, 1992) (re-
porting comments ofJonathan Turley, Professor of Law, Georgetown University).
5. See, e.g., M. Katherine Boychuk, Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or
Overbroad?, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 769 (1994) (applying void-for-vagueness doctrine to
anti-stalking laws); Robert N. Miller, "Stalk Talk": A First Look at Anti-Stalking Legisla-
tion, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303 (1993) (discussing constitutionality of stalking
laws); Silvija A. Strikis, Stopping Stalking, 81 GEo. L.J. 2771 (1993) (discussing con-
stitutional boundaries of anti-stalking legislation); Gera-Lind Kolarik, Stalking Laws
Proliferate, 78 A.B.A.J. 35 (Nov. 1992) (discussing constitutionality of various states'
stalking laws).
Constitutional challenges to anti-stalking laws have occurred in Florida, Illi-
nois, Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York. See, e.g., Champagne v. Gintick,
871 F. Supp. 1527 (D. Conn. 1994); State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1993); Bouters v. State, 634 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); People v. Krawiec,
634 N.E.2d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 637 N.E.2d
854 (Mass. 1994); People v. Payton, 612 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1994); see
generallyJudge: Anti-Stalking Law Unconstitutiona4 MiAlm HERALD, May 21, 1993, at
B5 (explaining that Hardee County Circuit Judge Dennis Maloney declared Flor-
ida's anti-stalking law unconstitutional on basis that it is "vague and overly broad");
George LardnerJr., Anti-Stalking Laws Proliferate; Several Face Court Challenges, WASH.
POST, Apr. 30, 1993, at A2 (discussing constitutional challenges to stalking statutes
in Florida, Illinois and Virginia); Jerry Shnay, Old Stalking Law Ruled Unconstitu-
tional, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 26, 1993, at SWI (stating that Will County Circuit Judge
William Penn declared Illinois stalking law unconstitutionally vague due to its fail-
ure to define word "follows" or phrase "in furtherance of"); Jill J. Spitz, Decision
Delivers Blow to Florida's Anti-Stalking Law; Circuit Judge Jerry T. Lockett Ruled that a
Section of the New Law, Applied to the 'Crime of the 90's, ' is Unconstitutional Because it is
Vague, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 3, 1993, at Al (stating that Circuit Judge Jerry T.
Lockett ruled definition of "harass" in Florida's anti-stalking law unconstitutionally
vague). For a discussion of the Florida anti-stalking statute, see infra notes 65-77
and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Boychuk, supra note 5, at 769-802 (discussing constitutionality of
stalking laws); Macon Morehouse, New Anti-Stalking Law Questioned byjudgefor Lack
of 'Guidelines', ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 4, 1993, at G3 (noting Fayette County
Judge White's interpretation that prosecutors need evidence that victim was in
"emotional distress or in fear of death or bodily harm" before they can charge
defendant with crime); Richard Seven, Stalking Law Too Narrow, Lawyers, Victims
Complain, SEr.TE TIMES, July 6, 1993, at BI (noting lawyers' complaints that law
too narrowly defines stalking); Jill J. Spitz, Many Feel State Stalking Law Doesn't Do
Much Protecting, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 30, 1993, at A10 (stating that many law
1388 [Vol. 39: p. 1387
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arising under the newly formulated anti-stalking laws, Congress directed
the National Institute of Justice to develop a Model stalking law which
would be both constitutional and effective. 7
This Comment analyzes the formation and viability of anti-stalking
laws. Initially, this Comment examines the traditional approach to stalk-
ing-type behavior and the failure of this approach to adequately protect
victims.8 This Comment then analyzes the California, Florida and Penn-
sylvania anti-stalking statutes as models of the various approaches taken by
the state legislatures in this area.9 This Comment also reviews federal bills
that would make stalking a federal crime. 10 This Comment compares the
enforcement officers have trouble understanding Florida's stalking law and there-
fore arrest only those who make violent threats); California Looking at Anti-Stalking
Law's Failures (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 2, 1993) (stating that California's
law requires "credible threat of bodily injury or death" in its definition of stalking,
making it difficult for prosecutors to charge suspect with stalking before actual
injury occurs). For a discussion of the California anti-stalking statute, see infra
notes 45-64 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Florida's anti-stalking stat-
ute, see infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
7. H.R. 8750, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The Bill provides, in relevant part:
§ 101. ANTI-STALKING LEGISLATION.
(A) Findings and Declarations-The Congress finds and declares that-
(1) the criminal act of stalking other persons is a problem of deep
concern;
(2) previously available legal recourse against stalking, such as re-
straining orders, have proven largely ineffective;
(3) anti-stalking legislation has been enacted or proposed in several
States;
(4) the constitutionality of several of the States' anti-stalking statutes
may be in question; and
(5) the Congress has an interest in assisting the States in enacting
anti-stalking legislation that is constitutional and enforceable.
(B) Evaluation-The Attorney General, acting through the Director of
the National Institute of Justice, shall-
(1) evaluate anti-stalking legislation and'proposed anti-stalking legisla-
tion in the States;
(2) develop model anti-stalking legislation that is constitutional and
enforceable;
(3) prepare and disseminate to State authorities the findings made as a
result of the evaluation; and
(4) not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, report to
the Congress the findings and the need or appropriateness of further
action by the Federal Government.
Id.; see George Lardner, Jr., Federal Task Force Suggests States Make Stalking a Felony
Offense, WASH. PosT, Sept. 12, 1993, at A19 (discussing congressional proposal for
model anti-stalking law). For a discussion of the Model Statute, see infra notes 170-
77 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the traditional approach to stalking-type behavior and
the failure of traditional remedies to adequately protect victims of stalking, see
infra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the California, Florida and Pennsylvania statutes, see
infra notes 41-89 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the federal bills, see infra notes 90-111 and accompany-
ing text.
1994] COMMENT 1389
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statutes and bills and then reviews the constitutionality of the California,
Florida and Pennsylvania anti-stalking statutes.11 In addition, this Com-
ment also discusses the possible failure of these anti-stalking laws to guard
against stalking behavior. 12 This Comment then analyzes how Congress'
Model statute has attempted to address the various problems identified in
the statutes discussed. 13 Lastly, this Comment concludes by addressing
the need for statutes drafted to deal more specifically with stalking.
14
II. BACKGROUND
In most cases, persons who stalk were involved in a former relation-
ship with the victim or believed they were involved in a relationship and
became obsessed with their victim. 15 The conduct of stalkers toward their
victims varies in intensity and form.16 Some cases involve constant "follow-
11. For a comparison of the three state statutes and the federal bills, see infra
notes 112-25. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the California, Florida
and Pennsylvania statutes, see infra notes 126-65 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the possible failure of the California, Florida and
Pennsylvania anti-stalking laws to guard against stalking behavior, see infra notes
166-69 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of how Congress' Model statute has attempted to address
the various problems identified in the statutes discussed, see infra notes 170-77 and
accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the need for drafting statutes to deal more specifically
with stalking, see infra notes 178-80.
15. See Robert A. Guy, Jr., Note, The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking
Laws, 46 VAND. L. REv. 991, 995 (1993) (stating that "a great deal of stalking is
related to domestic violence and former intimate relationships gone awry"); see also
Federal Anti-Stalking Bill Introduced in Senate, REuTERs, Mar. 2, 1993, at B1 (stating
that "[m]ost stalking cases involve women threatened by present or former hus-
bands or boyfriends or rejected suitors"); Bill McAllister, Senator's Wife Urges Anti-
Stalking Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1993, at A20 (noting that "[i]n most cases.., it
is former spouses, ex-boyfriends or former co-workers who are terrorizing wo-
men"); Rene Riley-Adams, Can Laws Stop the Obsessed?, THE TIMES (London), Feb.
22, 1993, at Al (stating that most cases of stalking involve stalkers "who refuse to
give up real relationships that have gone awry; [ I who become obsessed with a
superficial relationship established through work or leisure activities; and.., who
invent completely artificial relationships with someone ... whom they have never
met").
Stalking as used in this Comment is defined as "the act of following, harassing,
bothering, frightening and otherwise interfering with the private lives [of people]
by [one who has] even more sinister intentions toward them." Stalking the Wild
Stalker Law, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at A22. The definition of stalking varies
by statute. For a list of the state statutes defining stalking, see supra note 2.
16. See Rosalind Wright, They Send Their Victims Letters, Menace Them -And Some-
times Even Kill Them. You May Not Think Stalkers Prey On Women Like You, But They Do.
How Can They Be Stopped?, LADIES HOME J., Apr. 1994, at 153 (recounting various
stories of persons that have been stalked). According to Lieutenant John Lane of
the Los Angeles Police Department's Threat Management Unit, stalkers fall into
three broad categories. Id. at 218.
A little under 10 percent [of stalkers] suffer from erotomania, the delu-
sional belief that one is passionately loved by the object of one's desire.
Most often women .... these predators usually target famous people,
such as actors or politicians. Another 43 percent-mostly men-suffer
1390 [Vol. 39: p. 1387
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ing" and surveillance. 17 Other cases involve repeated unsolicited phone
calls, numerous unwanted mailings, and repeated visits to the victims'
home or work place.18 Still other cases involve "lying in wait," followed by
physical violence.1 9 The impact of stalking on victims is equally varied.
Some stalking victims have had to quit their jobs, relocate, or remove their
children from school.2
0
A. Traditional Approach to Stalking-Type Offenses
1. Civil Remedies
a. Restraining Orders
In most states, before the enactment of stalking laws, a stalker could
not be prosecuted unless the victim suffered some type of physical harm.2
1
Consequently, injunctions and restraining orders were the most widely
used protection mechanisms available to victims.22 Former spouses or for-
mer girlfriends frequently requested restraining orders to thwart contin-
ued advances by their ex-partner. 23 Because police often cannot or will
from love obsession, believing they can make the person love them if given
the chance.
The largest group of stalkers are affected by simple obsession. Also pri-
marily men, these pursuers know their victims personally-ex-wives, for-
mer employees-and are the ones most likely to turn violent.
Id.; see generally Guy, supra note 15, at 994-1000 (discussing nature of stalking
behavior).
17. See, e.g., Larry King Live, supra note 3 (discussing stalking case where Kath-
leen Krueger was followed and "watched over" for nine years by her husband's
former employee).
18. See, e.g., Melinda Beck et al., Murderous Obsession, NEwswEEKJuly 13, 1992,
at 60 (discussing stalking case where young couple, Glenn Beach and Karen
Ejavec, received numerous bizarre and threatening letters, phone calls and visits
from casual acquaintance of Karen's before they were murdered).
19. See, e.g., Bryan Miller, Thou Shalt Not Stalk, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 18, 1993, at C14
(discussing stalking case where Dawn Wilson was approached and then beaten by
her former husband as she exited store).
20. See S.K. Bardwell & Stephen Johnson, Driver, 39, is Accused of Stalking,
Hous. CHRON., June 29, 1993, at All (noting remarks by State Representative
Debra Danburg that, due to drastic measures victims often feel forced to take,
stalking itself is harmful even if no physical harm results).
21. See Federal Anti-Stalking Bill Introduced in Senate, supra note 15, at BI (noting
that "in many cases victims have been told by police that they cannot stop a stalker
until an attack occurs"); Stalkers Need Laws and Treatment, THE PLAIN DEALER, May
22, 1993, at B4 (noting that prior to enactment of anti-stalking law, under Ohio
law, stalkers could not be prosecuted until victim was physically harmed); Larry
King Live, supra note 3 (recording comments by Kathleen Krueger, stalking victim,
relating police response to her problem: " 'I'm sorry, there's nothing we can do
until he physically tries to hurt you.' ").
22. This Comment uses the terms injunction, protective order and restraining
order interchangeably to mean: a court order prohibiting the stalker from coming
into contact with the complainant or victim. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 784, 1223,
1314 (6th ed. 1990).
23. See Dana Parsons, Fear Becomes a Lifelong Companion For Stalking Victims,
LA. TIMES, May 9, 1993, at B1 ("[Los Angeles County's] domestic violence pro-
1994] COMMENT 1391
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not make an arrest in these situations, restraining orders provide victims
with some hope that the justice system has not failed them. Many inade-
quacies, however, accompany restraining orders. First, in order to obtain
a restraining order, most jurisdictions require that the applicant pay a fil-
ing fee.24 Second, offenders often ignore restraining orders.2 5 In addi-
tion, after victims successfully obtain a restraining order and the offender
violates it, the offender is met with an extremely lax enforcement mecha-
nism. 26 For the foregoing reasons, restraining orders do not provide ade-
quate protection against stalkers.
b. Tort Remedies
In addition to injunctive relief, stalking victims have several tort reme-
dies available. For instance, a victim may file a common-law suit against
the stalker for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, or assault or battery, depending on the circumstances. 2 7 However,
gram in recent years has been receiving about 200 requests a month for restraining
orders."). Furthermore, a recent study showed that "90 percent of all those mur-
dered by their intimate partners called police at least once [and] more than half
had called five times or more" yet the police could do nothing. 138 CONG. REC.
S13,469, S13,470 (1992) (comments by Senator Cohen (D-ME), citing studies con-
ducted in Detroit and Kansas City).
24. See generally Corwin, supra note 1 (discussing murder of woman who could
not afford restraining order filing fee of $182 until payday, which turned out to be
the day after she was murdered).
25. See 138 CONG. REc. S13,469 (1992) (noting Senator Cohen's of Maine dis-
cussion of failure of restraining orders). Senator Cohen reiterated the story of
Kristin Lardner, a 21 year-old woman killed by her ex-boyfriend, Michael Cartier,
despite a restraining order. Id. Three weeks before Cartier murdered Kristin, she
obtained a restraining order against Cartier after he had beaten her and left her
unconscious on a Boston street. Id. Cartier had "bragged to Kristin that [a] re-
straining order would do no good" and on May 30, 1992, he showed he was right
by shooting her to death. Id.
In some cases, restraining orders may actually provoke the stalker to become
violent. See McAllister, supra note 15 (quoting Helen M. Lardner that "the re-
straining order her sister [Kristin Lardner] obtained even may have provoked the
man to kill her"); see also Spitz, supra note 6 (citing case where man under injunc-
tion appeared at battered women shelter where his victim was located).
26. See Lardner, supra note 7 (explaining nature of lax enforcement mecha-
nism for restraining orders). "According to a recent study in Quincy, Massachu-
setts, only 18% of the men arrested for violating a restraining order or for
assaulting a woman repeatedly were sent to jail." Id. A probation officer in the
Quincy District Court added that he would be surprised if even 2% of such viola-
tors throughout the state were incarcerated. Id. "[Ilt [is] recognized, as a 1990
Justice Department study put it, that 'enforcement is the Achilles' heel' of the
[protection order] process." Id.; see also Miller, supra note 19 (stating that protec-
tion order process is plagued by inadequate enforcement mechanism). Dawn Wil-
son had her ex-husband, Christopher Wilson, arrested nine times for violating a
protection order to no avail. Id. Wilson continued to stalk Dawn, and it was only
after he beat her on two separate occasions, the second of which caused Dawn
facial disfiguration, that he was incarcerated for 15 months. Id.
27. See Matthew J. Gilligan, Note, Stalking the Stalker: Developing New Laws to
Thwart Those Who Terrorize Others, 27 GA. L. REv. 285, 288-90 (1992) (noting civil
6
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the same problems that face a victim when obtaining a restraining order
are also prevalent in tort actions. First, the victim must have the financial
stability to bring and maintain the suit.28 In addition, the victim may face
problems in proving the elements of the tort.2 9 Moreover, the threat of
monetary damages generally do not pose a significant deterrent to the
stalker who may be indigent or mentally ill.30 Therefore, traditional tort
remedies do not provide a solution to the stalking problem because they
fail to adequately protect victims or deter stalkers.
2. Criminal Remedies
a. Harassment
Traditionally, harassment statutes were the mechanism by which the
criminal system dealt with stalking-type behavior. Harassment has been
defined as "a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes
substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate pur-
pose."31 Although harassment statutes attempt to deter stalking-type be-
havior, some statutes only criminalize harassment by the use of the phone
or verbal harassment. 32
claims may be alleged against stalkers, but with limited utility); Andrea J. Robin-
son, Note, A Remedial Approach to Harassment, 70 VA. L. REv. 507, 516-17 (1984)
(noting statutory and common-law civil relief may be available to harassment
victims).
28. See Gilligan, supra note 27, at 292 (noting that prohibitive filing costs in
civil suits will discourage many stalking victims from asserting civil claims against
their stalker); see also Janice L. Grau, Comment, Restraining Order Legislation for
Battered Women: A Reassessment, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 703 (1982) (describing financial,
as well as other, barriers battered women face when seeking restraining orders).
29. See Gilligan, supra note 27, at 289-91 (noting difficulty stalking victims
have in proving claims of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress). For instance, to successfully win a case against the stalker for inva-
sion of privacy, the stalker must have threatened to invade or actually invaded the
victim's home or work environment. Id. at 289-90. Since a majority of the stalking
occurs in public, this element is difficult to prove. Id.
30. See Gilligan, Note, supra note 27, at 292-93 (noting that monetary dam-
ages, while discouraging some stalking behavior, will likely not stop determined
stalkers from carrying out their deranged desires).
31. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 717 (6th ed. 1990) (citing 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1514(c) (1)); see also Robinson, supra note 27, at 507 (defining harassment as "the
persistent and unwelcome communication of demands or feelings" and discussing
difficulty legal system has in dealing with harassment type behavior).
32. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 1311 (Supp. 1994); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 711-1106 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 720, para. 135/1-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4113
(1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:285 (West 1986); see also Robinson, supra note 27,
at 523-25 (discussing statutes that encompass solely telephonic harassment and
statutes that also prohibit nontelephonic harassment). Until the Georgia anti-
stalking law was put into effect "the Dekalb Solicitor's Office was able to prosecute
only the simple battery and harassing phone calls charges [the victim] lodged
against [her stalker]." Anne Rochell, Man Arrested Under New Anti-Stalking Law,
ATLANTrAJ. & CONsT., June 4, 1993, at J1.
1994] COMMENT 1393
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Furthermore, the majority of criminal harassment statutes do not de-
fine what "following" means, a central characteristic of stalking behavior.
33
Even those statutes that do prohibit acts of "following" suffer from two
inherent defects which make them incapable of deterring stalkers. First,
the penalties for violations of the harassment statutes are not stern enough
to dissuade a determined stalker.34 Second, there are no provisions en-
33. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1) (a) (West Supp. 1995); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 506-A (West 1992); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney
1987) (amended to include following in 1988); see generally Kathleen G. McAnaney,
Note, From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 819,
884-86 (1993) (discussing shortcomings of harassment statutes to effectively deal
with stalking-type behavior).
Many states have used the Model Penal Code as a guide for their harassment
statutes. The Model Penal Code provides:
Harassment. A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to
harass another, he:
(1) makes a telephone call without purpose of legitimate communica-
tion; or
(2) insults, taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to provoke
violent or disorderly response; or
(3) makes repeated communications anonymously or at extremely in-
convenient hours, or in offensively course language; or
(4) subjects another to an offensive touching; or
(5) engages in any other course of alarming conduct serving no legiti-
mate purpose of the actor.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 (1980); see ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 506-A (West
Supp. 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1987) (amended 1988); see gener-
ally Gilligan, supra note 27, at 297-99 (discussing applicability of harassment stat-
utes to stalking-type behavior).
In contrast to the Model Penal Code, some state harassment statutes do pro-
vide for the act of "following". See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709 (Supp.
1994). The Pennsylvania statute provides:
(a) Harassment- A person commits the crime of harassment when, with
intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person:
(1) he strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects him to physical contact,
or attempts or threatens to do the same; or
(2) he follows a person in or about a public place or places; or
(3) he engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which
alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate
purpose.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709 (Supp. 1994) (making harass-
ment summary offense). Before Pennsylvania enacted its anti-stalking statute,
stalking was considered harassment, which is a summary offense punishable by
only a maximum sentence of 90 days in jail and a $300 fine. Id. § 2709(c) (1).
Other states similarly have lenient penalties for harassment. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 525.070 (Baldwin 1992) (providing that harassment is punishable by only
$250 fine); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1993) (providing that harassment
is punishable by not more than 15 days in jail); O'Pake Seeks Prompt Casey Signature of
Anti-Stalking Bill, PR NEWSWIRE, June 10, 1993 (noting that current Pennsylvania
harassment law calls for only 90 days in jail and $300 fine).
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hancing penalties for repeat offenders which, by definition, include
stalkers.3 5
b. Other Criminal Remedies
In addition to harassment statutes, a variety of other criminal laws
prosecute stalking-type behavior. For example, where the stalker has phys-
ically harmed the victim, authorities may prosecute the stalker for either
simple assault or aggravated assault.3 6 Where the stalker has threatened
the victim with violence or with the intent to terrorize the victim, the
stalker may be prosecuted for terroristic threats.3 7 Trespassing statutes
also aided in apprehending stalkers before the enactment of stalking
laws.38
These traditional criminal remedies, however, suffer from the same
deficiencies as harassment statutes. First, the penalties imposed by the var-
ious statutes, with the exception of aggravated assault which may be classi-
fied as a felony, do not pose a significant deterrent to stalkers.39 In
addition, provisions for repeat offenders are not present, which also di-
minishes the deterrent effect of these laws.40
35. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(a) (1983) (providing no enhance-
ment in penalties for repeat offenders) (amended in 1993 to escalate repeat of-
fenses to third degree felony).
36. See, e.g., id. § 2701 (1983 & Supp. 1994) (criminalizing simple assault); id.
§ 2702 (Supp. 1994) (criminalizing aggravated assault). The classification of the
assault depends on the severity of the harm suffered and the intent of the stalker.
Id.
37. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (1980); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2706 (1983); see also McAllister, supra note 15, at A20 (stating that law enforce-
ment officials were finally able to arrest stalker after he left threatening telephone
message which was "specific enough for the FBI to act under [ federal extortion
law that makes explicit death threats by telephone illegal").
38. Se e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 810.08 to .09 (West Supp. 1994) (trespassing
statute); see also Stu Smith, Cooperative Agreement to Develop Model State Anti-Stalking
Law, U.S. NEwswntE, Dec. 23, 1992 (stating that "[e]xisting laws against trespassing
and harassing are helpful but frequently insufficient to completely protect poten-
tial [stalking] victims until it is too late").
39. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 810.08 to .09 (West Supp. 1994) (providing
crime of trespassing as misdemeanor); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2701 (1983 &
Supp. 1994) (providing crime of simple assault is punishable as misdemeanor); id.
§ 2706 (1983) (providing crime of terroristic threats as misdemeanor). But see
MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (1980) (grading terroristic threats as felony). Aggra-
vated assault is graded as a felony depending on the circumstances. See 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2702 (Supp. 1994) (providing conditions for aggravated assault
as felony in first and second degrees); see generally Gilligan, supra note 27, at 295-99
(discussing lack of deterrence of traditional criminal remedies).
40. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 810.08 to
.09 (West 1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2702 (Supp. 1994); id. § 2701 (1983 &
Supp. 1994); id. § 2706 (1983).
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B. Anti-Stalking Statutes
California enacted the.first anti-stalking law in 1990, setting in motion
a trend to combat stalking that continues today.41 Florida followed Cali-
fornia's lead and enacted its own anti-stalking law, thought to be one of
the toughest in the country.42 Moreover, Pennsylvania was one of the
most recent states to enact an anti-stalking law.43 In addition, Congress
introduced a bill, entitled the Federal Anti-Stalker Act of 1993, that would
make stalking a federal crime." The combination of the three states' stat-
utes and the federal bill provide an equitable representation of anti-stalk-
ing laws throughout the country. This Comment will examine these
statutes separately in order to analyze the viability of anti-stalking laws
generally.
1. The California Statute
In an attempt to thwart stalking, California's anti-stalking statute pro-
hibits repeated following or harassment by someone who makes an inten-
tional credible threat toward another.45 Accordingly, the statute requires
two distinct and separate actions on the part of the stalker. First, the
stalker must repeatedly follow or harass his or her victim. 46 However, the
statute does not define "follows" presumably because its meaning is
clear. 47 The statute defines "harassment" as a course of conduct by
the stalker, directed at the victim, causing the victim serious annoyance
or fear and servingno legitimate purpose.48 In addition, the statute
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1995). For a discussion of the Cali-
fornia statute, see infra notes 45-64 and accompanying text.
42. See James Thomas Tucker, Note, Stalking the Problems with Stalking Laws:
The Effectiveness of Florida Statutes Section 784.048, 45 FLA. L. REv. 609, 611 (discuss-
ing Florida's anti-stalking statute); see also FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048 (1994). For a
discussion of the Florida statute, see infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
43. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(b), (c)-(f) (Supp. 1994). For a discussion
of the Pennsylvania statute, see infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
44. H.R. 740, 103d Cong., 1st sess. (1993). For a discussion of the federal bill,
see infra notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1995). The statute provides:
(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or ha-
rasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to
place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of
his or her immediate family, is guilty of the crime of stalking, punishable
by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by a fine
of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and
imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison.
Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. (defining crime of stalking without defining word "follows").
48. Id. The statute provides:
(d) For the purposes of this section, "harasses" means a knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously
alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes the person, and which serves no
legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a
1396 [Vol. 39: p. 1387
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does not delineate a specific period of time for the phrase "course of
conduct."49
Second, the stalker must make a "credible threat" with the intent to
place the victim in fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her
family.50 A "credible threat" encompasses both verbal and implied threats
made with the intent to cause the victim to fear for his or her safety or the
safety of others.5 1 To narrow the scope of "credible threats," the Califor-
nia statute explicitly excludes constitutionally protected activities from its
definition of "course of conduct."5 2 In addition, the statute specifically
excludes labor picketing from its scope.5 3
The California statute, like the majority of other anti-stalking statutes,
provides for enhanced punishment for repeat offenders.54 If the stalker
violates a court order forbidding him or her from contacting the victim
and is subsequently found guilty of stalking under the statute, the stalker
may also be subjected to enhanced punishment.55 When a stalker, who
was previously convicted of a felony under the statute, is subsequently con-
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actu-
ally cause substantial emotional distress to the person.
Id. § 646.9(d).
49. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (failing to define specific period of time
for purposes of establishing course of conduct). The statute merely provides that
the phrase " '[c] ourse of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a se-
ries of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose."
Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id. § 646.9(a).
51. Id. § 646.9 (e). The statute provides:
(e) For purposes of this section, "credible threat" means a verbal or writ-
ten threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of
verbal or written statements and conduct made with the intent and the
apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is
the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the
safety of his or her immediate family.
Id.
52. Id. § 646.9(d). The statute provides that "[cionstitutionally protected ac-
tivity is not included within the meaning of 'course of conduct.' " Id.
53. Id. § 646.9(f). The statute provides that "[tihis section [§ 646.9] shall not
apply to conduct which occurs during labor picketing." Id.
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(c). The statute provides: "[e]very person who,
having been convicted of a felony under this section, commits a second or subse-
quent violation of this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for two, three, or four years." Id. In addition, the statute indicates that if
the stalker is sentenced to the state prison he may not be fined in addition to that
sentence whereas if he were sentenced to the county prison he may be subjected to
both the prison term and the fine. Id. § 646.9(a).
55. Id. § 646.9(b). The statute provides:
(b) Any person who violates subdivision (a) when there is a temporary
restraining order, injunction, or any other court order in effect prohibit-
ing the behavior described in subdivision (a) [of section 646.9] against
the same party, shall be punished.by imprisonment in the state prison for
two, three, or four years.
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victed of stalking, the stalker is subject to much harsher penalties.5 6 For
example, the repeat stalker could be sentenced to a term of up to four
years in state prison.
57
The California statute also provides for mandatory counseling if the
court sentences the stalker to a period of probation. 58 However, a court
may determine, upon a showing of good cause, that counseling need not
be imposed.59 In addition, the statute gives the court authority to issue a
restraining order for a period of up to ten years.6 0
The California anti-stalking statute provides law enforcement with a
more powerful tool to prosecute stalkers than prior penal statutes such as
harassment statutes.61 In addition, the anti-stalking statute reaches re-
peated harassment as well as repeated "following."62 The state legislature
recognized the need for enhanced punishment for both repeat offenders
and for offenders who violate restraining orders.63 However, the statute
does require that a "credible threat" be present, and that may be difficult
to establish in some cases. 6 4
56. Id. § 646.9(c) (providing imprisonment in state prison for up to four years
for felons who commit subsequent violations of anti-stalking statute).
57. Id. The stalker could be sentenced to the state prison for two, three or
four years if previously convicted of a felony under the statute. Id.
58. Id. § 646.9(g). The statute provides:
(g) If probation is granted, or the execution or imposition of a sentence
is suspended, for any person convicted under this section, it shall be a
condition of probation that the person participate in counseling, as desig-
nated by the court. However, the court, upon a showing of good cause,
may find that the counseling requirement shall not be imposed.
Id.
59. Id. § 646.9(g). However, the statute provides no guidelines as to what
constitutes "good cause." Id.
60. Id. § 646.9(h). The statute provides:
(h) The court shall also consider issuing an order restraining the defend-
ant from any contact with the victim, that may be valid for up to 10 years,
as determined by the court. It is the intent of the Legislature that the
length of any restraining order be based upon the seriousness of the facts
before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of the
victim and his or her immediate family. The duration of the restraining
order may be longer than five years only in an extreme case, where
longer duration is necessary to protect the safety of the victim or his or
her immediate family.
Id.
61. Compare id. § 646.9 (including repeated "harassment" behavior within
meaning of "stalking") with id. § 653m (omitting "stalking"-type behavior from
meaning of "harassment" in criminal harassment statute).
62. See id. § 646.9(a)-(c) (reaching repeated harassment and imposing en-
hanced sentences).
63. Id. § 646.9(b)-(c).
64. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(b)-(c); see also Corwin, supra note 1, at Al (dis-
cussing California case in which stalker harassed and followed victim for one year
but did not threaten her until one week prior to killing her).
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2. The Foida Statute
Following California's lead, the legislature for the State of Florida en-
acted a similar anti-stalking statute in 1992.65 The Florida statute contains
two distinct crimes within its parameters. First, the statute criminalizes
"stalking," which is defined as repeated following or harassing.6 Such
65. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048 (1994). The Florida statute provides:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Harasses" means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a spe-
cific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and
serves no legitimate purpose.
(b) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a se-
ries of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity
of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the
meaning of "course of conduct." Such constitutionally protected activity
includes picketing or other organized, protests.
(c) "Credible threat" means a threat made with the intent to cause the
person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her
safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily
injury to, a person.
(2) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or ha-
rasses another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of
the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(3) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or ha-
rasses another person, and makes a credible threat with the intent to
place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury, commits
the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punish-
able as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(4) Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat
violence pursuant to s. 784.046, or an injunction for protection against
domestic violence pursuant to s. 741.30, or after any other court-imposed
prohibition of conduct toward the subject person or that person's prop-
erty, knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses
another person commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of
the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084.
(5) Any law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant, any per-
son he or she has probable cause to believe has violated the provisions of
this section.
Id.
66. Id. ch. 784.048(2). The statute provides that "[a]ny person who willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the of-
fense of stalking .... " Id. As in the California statute, "follows" is not defined
presumably because its meaning is clear. See id. ch. 784.048 (failing to define "fol-
lows"). For a discussion concerning the lack of a definition for the term "follow-
ing" in the California statute, see supra text accompanying note 47.
The Florida statute defines "harasses" as a course of conduct which causes
substantial emotional distress and furthers no legitimate purpose. FLA. STAT. ch.
784.048(1) (a). This definition is similar to California's definition of "harassment."
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d). For a discussion of the term "harassment" as
defined in the California statute, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
The Florida statute's definition of "course of conduct" also does not include a
specified time frame. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(1)(b). Therefore, as in the Califor-
nia statute, the course of conduct can take place over any period of time, however
short. For a discussion of the time frame of the phrase "course of conduct" under
the California statute, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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stalking is punishable under the statute as a misdemeanor of the first de-
gree. 6 7 Second, the statute criminalizes aggravated stalking, a separate but
related offense. 68 Aggravated stalking requires the presence of a credible
threat, and is punishable as a third degree felony.69
Although the Florida statute does not provide for enhanced punish-
ment of repeat offenders, it elevates stalking to the crime of aggravated
stalking when the offender stalks a victim in violation of an injunction or
other court-imposed prohibition of conduct toward a victim. 70 The lack
of a repeat offender provision may be rendered insignificant because, pre-
sumably, when an offender is sentenced for violating the stalking statute,
an injunction will be issued against him or her, forbidding future contact
with the victim. However, after that injunction expires, the enhanced
punishment provision is no longer applicable and thus the repeat stalker
is treated as a first time offender.
Although the Florida anti-stalking statute prohibits a broad range of
behaviors, there are certain limitations built into the statute. For example,
the Florida statute explicitly states that "[c]onstitutionally protected activ-
ity is not within the meaning of 'course of conduct.' "71 Picketing and
other organized protests are examples of constitutionally protected activity
within the meaning of the statute.72 A unique provision of the Florida
statute permits a law enforcement officer to arrest a person, without a war-
rant, when the officer has probable cause to believe that such person vio-
lated the statute.73
Florida's anti-stalking statute is broad, encompassing a wide range of
behavior. The statute utilizes a two-tiered system of punishment for pro-
hibited behavior, providing a remedy for those stalking victims who were
67. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(2).
68. Id. ch. 784.048(3). The statute provides that "[a]ny person who willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person, and makes a credi-
ble threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily
injury, commits the offense of aggravated stalking .... " Id.
69. Id. The statute defines "credible threat" as a threat which is intended to
cause the threatened individual to reasonably fear for his or her safety. Id. ch.
784.048(1)(c). In addition, the threat must be to cause severe bodily injury or
death to someone. Id. This definition is similar to the California statute's defini-
tion of "credible threat." See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (defining "credible
threat"). For a discussion of the California statute's definition of the term "credi-
ble threat," see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
However, unlike the California statute, the Florida statute does not require
the victim to subjectively believe that the stalker has the apparent ability to carry
out his or her threat. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (requiring target of threat to
"reasonably fear" for his or her safety). For a discussion of California's subjective
intent requirement, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
70. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(4).
71. Id. ch. 784.048(1)(b).
72. Id.
73. Id. ch. 784.048(5). The statute provides that "[a]ny law enforcement of-
ficer may arrest, without a warrant, any person he or she has probable cause to
believe has violated the provisions of this section." Id. (emphasis added).
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never threatened by their stalker, as well as for those victims who were
threatened.74 Therefore, the Florida statute gives law enforcement of-
ficers a more potent weapon with which to fight stalking than other crimi-
nal code provisions such as harassment statutes.
In conclusion, Florida's anti-stalking statute criminalizes both harass-
ment and "following" if done in a manner forbidden by the statute. The
statute thereby provides the stalking victim with a remedy prior to the
stalker making physical contact with the victim. 75 In addition, the statute
authorizes law enforcement officers to arrest a suspected stalker without a
warrant, thereby affording speedier relief to the victim. 76 However, the
broad characteristics of the Florida statute may render it susceptible to
constitutional attack.
77
3. The Pennsylvania Statute
In 1993, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted an anti-stalking
statute.78 The Pennsylvania statute prohibits a course of conduct or re-
peated acts toward another person which indicate an intent to cause that
person substantial emotional distress or place that person in fear of bodily
harm.79 The statute specifically includes "following" as prohibited con-
duct, but, like the California and Florida statutes, fails to define it.80 The
74. Id. ch. 784.048. Under the Florida statute, a stalker need not threaten a
victim before a stalking violation occurs; the stalker need only follow or harass the
victim. Id. ch. 784.048(2). However, if the victim is actually threatened by the
stalker, the stalking violation is elevated to aggravated stalking. Id. ch. 784.048(3).
See Guy, supra note 15 at 1003-04 (noting that Florida statute does not require
credible threat for stalking offenses).
75. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(2). For a discussion of Florida's first degree misde-
meanor of stalking, see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
76. Id. ch. 784.048 (5). For a discussion of the provision allowing law enforce-
ment officers to arrest suspected stalkers without an arrest warrant, see supra note
65.
77. Tucker, supra note 42, at 633 (discussing constitutionality of Florida's anti-
stalking statute). For a full discussion of the constitutionality of the Florida statute,
see infra notes 146-57 and accompanying text.
78. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(b), (c)-(f) (Supp. 1994). The statute
provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Stalking.- A person commits the crime of stalking when he engages
in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts toward another person,
including following the person without proper authority, under circum-
stances which demonstrate either of the following:
(1) an intent to place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury;
or
(2) an intent to cause substantial emotional distress to the person.
Id.
79. Id. § 2709(b).
80. Id. Once again, as in the California statute and the Florida statute, "fol-
lowing" is not defined in the Pennsylvania statute presumably because its meaning
is clear. Id. For a discussion of "following" in the California statute, see supra text
accompanying note 47. For a discussion of "following" in the Florida statute, see
supra note 66.
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Pennsylvania statute defines the phrase "course of conduct" as a pattern of
actions which indicate a continuity of conduct.8 1 The time frame for the
pattern of actions is stated as only "however short."8 2 "Emotional distress"
is defined as "[a] temporary or permanent state of great physical or
mental strain."8 3
Pennsylvania imposes a graduated grading system for violations of the
statute. 84 As a general rule, the first stalking offense is a misdemeanor of
the first degree.8 5 However, a first offense may be upgraded to a third
degree felony if the offender was convicted of a previous crime of violence
toward the victim, the victim's family or household members, or if the
offender violated a protection order.86 The statute enumerates examples
of crimes of violence, but does not specifically provide a time period
within which the offender's prior conviction must have occurred.8 7 Fur-
ther, the statute defines "family or household member" broadly to encom-
pass a spectrum of people ranging from former spouses to former intimate
partners.88 The statute also excludes conduct related to labor disputes
and any other "constitutionally protected activity."
8 9
81. Id. § 2709(f). The statute defines "course of conduct" as "a pattern of
actions composed of more than one act over a period of time, however short, evi-
dencing a continuity of conduct." Id.
82. Id.
83. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(f). The statute defines "emotional dis-
tress" as "a temporary or permanent state of great physical or mental strain." Id.
84. See id. § 2709(c). The statute provides:
(c) Grading.-...
(2) (i) An offense under subsection (b) shall constitute a misde-
meanor of the first degree.
(ii) A second or subsequent offense under subsection (b) or a first
offense under subsection (d) if the person has been previously convicted
of any crime of violence involving this same victim, family or household
members, including, but not limited to, a violation of 2701 (relating to
simple assault), 2702 (relating to aggravated assault), 2705 (relating to
recklessly endangering another person), 2901 (relating to kidnapping),
3121 (relating to rape), 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual inter-
course), or 3128 (relating to spousal sexual assault), an order issued
under 4954 (relating to protective orders) or an order issued under 23
Pa.C.S. § 6108 (relating to relief), shall constitute a felony of the third
degree.
Id.
85. Id. § 2709(c) (2) (i).
86. Id. § 2709(c) (2) (ii).
87. Id.
88. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(f). The statute defines "family or house-
hold member" as "spouses or persons who have been spouses, persons living as
spouses or who lived as spouses, parents and children, other persons related by
consanguinity or affinity, current or former sexual or intimate partners or persons
who share biological parenthood." Id. (footnote omitted).
89. Id. § 2709(e). The statute provides that "this section [§ 2709] shall not
apply to conduct by a party to a labor dispute as defined in the act ofJune 2, 1937
(P.L. 1198, No. 308), known as the Labor Anti-Injunction Act, or to any constitu-
tionally protected activity." Id.
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The Pennsylvania statute is broad, reaching conduct that may cause
only emotional distress to a victim, even if no credible threat is present.
However, the scope of the statute is narrowed by its exclusion of constitu-
tionally protected activity. Nevertheless, the upgrade provision for repeat
offenders and those with a prior conviction for a violent crime or a viola-
tion of a protection order provides a formidable deterrent for potential
offenders.
4. Federal Anti-Stalking Bills
There are currently two active Bills, one in the House (House Bill)
and one in the Senate (Senate Bill), which intend to make stalking a fed-
eral offense. The House Bill defines stalking somewhat narrowly, requir-
ing a stalker to repeatedly follow or harass a victim and make a credible
threat toward the victim.90 Although the term "following" is not defined
in the House Bill, the statute defines the term "harass" as an objectionable
course of conduct directed at a victim which causes the victim to suffer
both subjective and objective emotional distress.9 1 The House Bill de-
scribes the phrase "course of conduct" as a pattern of conduct, over any
period of time, that shows a continuity of purpose.92 To have a "credible
90. H.R. 740, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The House Bill, entitled the Fed-
eral Anti-Stalker Act of 1993, suggests an amendment to 18 U.S.C. ch. 41 and is,
referred to as § 880. The House Bill provides, in pertinent part:
880. Stalking
(a) Whoever, in a circumstance described in subsection (c) of this sec-
tion willfully and maliciously-
(1) repeatedly follows or harasses another person; and
(2) makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in rea-
sonable fear of the death or serious bodily injury of that person or a
member of that person's immediate family;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section ....
(e) This section does not prohibit activity protected by the Constitution.
Id.
91. Id. § 880(d) (1). The Bill provides:
(d) For the purposes of this section-
(1) one harasses a person if-
(A) one knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed specifi-
cally at that person;
(B) that conduct seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses that person
but serves no legitimate purpose; and
(C) the course of conduct is such as would cause a reasonable per-
son to suffer substantial emotional distress and does in fact cause
substantial emotional distress to the person against whom it is
directed.
Id.
92. Id. § 880(d) (2). The Bill defines "course of conduct" as "a pattern or con-
duct [sic] composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evi-
dencing a continuity of purpose .... Id.
1994] COMMENT 1403
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threat," a threat must be made with the intent and apparent ability to carry
it out and it must cause the victim to reasonably fear for his or her safety. 93
Three different trigger mechanisms allow the House Bill to apply to a
given stalking action. First, the House Bill applies if the offender crossed
state lines to commit an offense punishable under the Bill. 94 Second, the
House Bill applies if "the offender in the course of the offense used the
United States mail or a facility in, or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce."95 Third, the House Bill applies if "the offense occurred in the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States."96 The
punishment for a violation escalates depending on whether the violation is
a first offense, a second or subsequent offense against the same victim, or
an offense that violated a court order prohibiting such contact with the
victim.
9 7
The Senate Bill is similar to the House Bill, but differs in its definition
of what constitutes stalking and in its penalties for stalkers.9 8 To commit
93. Id. § 880(d) (3). The Bill defines "credible threat" as "a threat made with
the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person
who is the target of the threat a reasonable fear for that person's safety." Id.
94. Id. § 880(c). The Bill requires that "the offender crossed the border of a
State during or for the purposes of the commission of the offense .. " Id.
95. Id. (stating a violation occurs if "the offender in the course of the offense
used the United States mail or a facility in, or instrumentality of interstate
commerce").
96. Id. (stating that violation occurs if "the offense occurred in the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States"). However, the Bill ex-
pressly provides that it is not applicable to any constitutionally protected activity.
Id. § 880(e).
97. Id. § 880(b). The Bill provides:
(b) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) of this section
is-
(1) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both, in the case of a first conviction under such subsection or a sec-
ond or subsequent conviction not described in paragraph (2) (B); and
(2) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than three years,
or both, if the offense-
(A) violated a restraining order or other court order in effect
prohibiting the behavior; or
(B) is a second or subsequent conviction under this section and is
against the same victim as a prior offense under this section.
Id.
98. S. 470, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The Senate Bill suggesting an
amendment to 18 U.S.C. ch. 41 is also referred to as § 880. The Bill provides:
880. Stalking
OFFENSES.-
(1) A person who, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, in the course of interstate travel, or by the use of an
instrument of interstate or foreign commerce, harasses or makes a credi-
ble threat against another person shall be imprisoned not more than 2
years, fined not more than $5,000, or both.
(2) A person who is under a protection order who, in the special mari-
time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in the course of in-
terstate travel, or by the use of an instrument of interstate or foreign
1404 [Vol. 39: p. 1387
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the offense of stalking, the stalker must harass the victim or make a credi-
ble threat against the victim.99 "Following" is not expressly stated as pro-
hibited behavior, but it could conceivably be included in the definition of
"harass." The definitions of "harass," "credible threat," and "course of
conduct" are the same as the definitions for these terms in the House
Bill. 10 0 The trigger mechanism is also the same as that in the House
Bill;101 however, the Senate Bill provides that the stalker must engage in
the prohibited conduct within thirty days of entering the state in which
the conduct occurs for the conduct to be considered in the course of in-
terstate or foreign travel.10 2 The Senate Bill does not contain a provision
for excepting constitutionally protected activity.' 0 3
The Senate Bill provides stronger penalties for a stalking violation
than the House Bill.10 4 The Senate Bill states that a first offender, who is
not the subject of a protection order issued to the victim, is subject to
commerce, harasses or makes a credible threat against another person
shall be imprisoned not less than 2 years nor more than 4 years, fined not
less than $5,000 nor more than $100,000, or both.
(3) A person with a prior stalking conviction who, in the special mari-
time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in the course of in-
terstate travel, or by the use of an instrument of interstate or foreign
commerce, harasses or makes a credible threat against another person
shall be imprisoned not less than 5 years nor more than 10 years, fined
not less than $25,000 nor more than $200,000, or both.
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.- For the purposes of subsection (b),
a person shall be considered to engage in conduct in the course of inter-
state or foreign travel if-
(1) the person travels from 1 State to another or from a foreign country
to a State with the intention of engaging in that conduct; and
(2) the person engages in the conduct within 30 days after entering the
State in which the conduct occurs.
Id.
99. Id. § 880(a). The Senate Bill defines "harass" as "to engage in a knowing
and willful course of conduct that (A) is directed at a particular person; (B) seri-
ously alarms, disturbs, harasses, or terrorizes the person; (C) serves no legitimate
purpose; (D) would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional dis-
tress; and (E) in fact causes substantial emotional distress to the person." Id. The
Bill defines "credible threat" as "a threat to cause great bodily injury or death to a
person made with the intent to place the person in reasonable fear of great bodily
injury or death to himself or herself or a member of his or her family and with the
apparent ability to carry out the threat." Id.
100. Id. The Senate Bill defines "course of conduct" as "a pattern of conduct
composed of a series of acts over a period of time (regardless of length of time)
evidencing a continuity of purpose." Id.; accord H.R. 740, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (defining "course of conduct").
101. Compare H.R. 740, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) with S. 470, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (defining circumstances that will trigger stalking as a federal of-
fense). For a discussion of the trigger mechanisms of the House Bill, see supra
notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
102. S. 470, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 880(c) (1993).
103. Id.
104. Compare H.R. 740, 103d Cong' 1st Sess. (1993) with S. 470, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (providing for stiffer penalties in Senate Bill).
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imprisonment of up to two years or a fine of up to $5,000, or both. 10 5 If
the stalker violates a protective order by stalking a victim, he or she must
be imprisoned for at least two years, but no more than four years, or fined
at least $5,000, but no more than $100,000, or receive both the incarcera-
tion and fine. 10 6 If the stalker has one or more prior stalking convictions
and subsequently stalks another victim, the stalker shall be imprisoned for
a minimum of five years, but no more than ten years, or fined a minimum
of $25,000, but no more than $200,000, or receive both the incarceration
and fine. 10 7
The Senate Bill provides that courts shall consider issuing an injunc-
tion preventing the stalker from further contact with the victim for a pe-
riod of up to ten years.10 8 In order to issue an injunction for longer than
five years, however, a court must make specific findings that a longer time
105. S. 470, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 880 (b)(1) (1993).
106. Id. § 880(b)(2). The Senate Bill provides:
(2) A person who is under a protection order who, in the special mari-
time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in the course of in-
terstate travel, or by the use of an instrument of interstate or foreign
commerce, harasses or makes a credible threat against another person
shall be imprisoned not less than 2 years nor more than 4 years, fined not
less than $5,000 nor more than $100,000, or both.
Id. The Bill defines a "protection order" as "an order of any court that (A) re-
strains a person from engaging in conduct prohibited by this section; or (B) re-
strains a person from intentionally coming into unsolicited contact, directly or
indirectly, with a person protected under this section." Id.
107. Id. § 880(b) (3). The Senate Bill provides:
(3) A person with a prior stalking conviction who, in the special mari-
time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in the course of in-
terstate travel, or by the use of an instrument of interstate or foreign
commerce, harasses or makes a credible threat against another person
shall be imprisoned not less than 5 years nor more than 10 years, fined
not less than $25,000 nor more than $200,000, or both.
Id. The Senate Bill defines "prior convictions" as "(A) a conviction under this
section; and (B) a conviction under state law prohibiting conduct that is prohib-
ited by this section." Id.
108. Id. § 880(f). The Senate Bill provides:
(f) INJUNCTION.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-A court shall consider issuing an order enjoining an
offender under this section from any contact with the victim for a period
of up to 10 years.
(2) DURATION.-
(A) the duration of an injunction under this subsection shall be de-
termined in light of-
(i) the seriousness of the facts before the court;
(ii) the likelihood that the offender will violate this section again;
and
(iii) the safety of the victim and the victim's immediate family.
(B) The duration of an injunction under this subsection may be
longer than 5 years only in an extreme case in which a longer dura-
tion is necessary to protect the safety of the victim or the victim's
immediate family.
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period is necessary. 10 9 The Senate Bill also provides that if probation is
granted to the stalker, the stalker must undergo counseling, unless the
court, upon a showing of good cause, deems the counseling unneces-
sary. 110 The Senate Bill also provides that when a state anti-stalking law
and the proposed federal anti-stalking law are both violated by the same
offense, the offender shall be prosecuted under the state law, unless the
Attorney General determines that "the offender will not be expeditiously
or effectively prosecuted under the state law."' 1l
III. ANALYSiS
A. A Comparison of the Statutes and Bills
When traditional civil and criminal remedies failed to protect stalking
victims, several states developed anti-stalking statutes to criminalize stalk-
ing behavior. 112 Of the statutes and bills discussed in this Comment, the
Florida statute provides the broadest protection because, although it re-
quires willful, malicious and repeated following or harassment to establish
a stalking offense, it requires neither an intent to harm nor actual emo-
tional distress. 113 The Pennsylvania statute is slightly narrower than the
Florida statute because it requires acts indicating an intent by the stalker
to place the victim in reasonable fear of bodily injury or an intent by the
stalker to cause the victim to suffer substantial emotional distress. 114 The
Senate Bill is also slightly less broad than the Florida statute, because it
prohibits conduct which harasses the victim, but only when the victim suf-
fers actual and substantial emotional distress. 11 5 The California statute
109. Id.
110. Id. § 880(e). The Bill provides that "if probation is granted to an of-
fender under this section, it shall be a condition of probation that the offender
participate in counseling, unless the court, upon a showing of good cause, finds
that counseling is not necessary." Id.
111. Id. § 880(d). The Bill provides:
(d) PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION.- An offense under subsection
(b) that is also an offense within the jurisdiction of a State shall not be
prosecuted by the United States under this section unless the Attorney
General (or the highest ranking subordinate of the Attorney General
with responsibility for criminal prosecutions) makes a written determina-
tion that, in the judgement of the official who makes the determination,
the offender will not be expeditiously or effectively prosecuted under
State law.
Id.
112. For a complete list of the states that have passed anti-stalking laws, see
supra note 2. For a discussion of the inadequacies of traditional civil remedies, see
supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the inadequacies of
traditional criminal remedies, see supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
113. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(2) (1994). For a discussion of the Florida statute,
see supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
114. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(b) (Supp. 1994). For a discussion of the
Pennsylvania statute, see supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
115. S. 470, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). For a discussion of the Senate Bill,
see supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
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and the House Bill are the most narrow; both require "following" or
"harassing" of a victim by the stalker and the making of a "credible
threat."116
Both the California statute and the House Bill require that a "credible
threat" be present before an action may be deemed a stalking offense.
117
However, the Florida statute only requires a "credible threat" for the sepa-
rate and enhanced crime of aggravated stalking. 118 In addition, the Sen-
ate Bill provides that stalking may be present without a "credible
threat."'1 19 Furthermore, the term "credible threat" is not mentioned in
the Pennsylvania statute's definition of stalking, but analogous behavior is
actionable, though not required. 12 0 These statutes demonstrate that the
"credible threat" requirement can considerably narrow the scope and pro-
tections offered by anti-stalking statutes.12 1
The California, Pennsylvania and Florida statutes and the House Bill
expressly state that their provisions do not prohibit constitutionally pro-
tected activity. 122 Recognizing the constitutional importance of labor
picketing, the California and Pennsylvania statutes also expressly prohibit
application of the anti-stalking statute to labor picketing. 12 3 However, the
Senate Bill does not explicitly provide an exception for conduct related to
constitutional activities.' 24 The Florida statute, unlike the Senate and
House Bills and the California and Pennsylvania statutes, provides an ex-
ception to the arrest warrant requirement for the arrest of a suspected
116. Compare H.R. 740, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) with CAL. PENAL. CODE
§ 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1994) (both using very similar language to define stalking
behavior). For a discussion of the California statute, see supra notes 45-64 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the House Bill, see supra notes 90-97 and
accompanying text.
117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1994); H.R. 740, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993). For a discussion of the House Bill, see supra notes 90-97 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the California statute, see supra notes 45-
64 and accompanying text.
118. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(3) (1994). For a discussion of the Florida statute,
see supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
119. S. 470, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). For a discussion of the Senate Bill,
see supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
120. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(b) (Supp. 1994) (punishing stalker
with intent to place victim in reasonable fear of bodily injury or with intent to
cause substantial emotional distress to victim). For a discussion of the Pennsylvania
statute, see supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ch.
784.048(1)(b) (1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(e) (Supp. 1994); H.R. 740,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(0; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(e).
123. See S. 470, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (lacking exception for conduct
related to constitutionally protected activities).
124. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(5) (1994).
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stalker. 125 Even statutory language protecting or limiting conststitutional
rights may not save an anti-stalking statute from constitutional attack.
B. The Constitutionality of the Statutes
Anti-stalking statutes may be subject to constitutional attack based on
both the overbreadth and void for vagueness doctrines. 126 "The over-
breadth doctrine postulates that the government may not achieve its con-
cededly valid purpose by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly,
reaching constitutionally protected as well as unprotected activity."
12 7
Two prongs comprise the void for vagueness doctrine. 128 The first prong
addresses whether the statute is sufficiently clear in expressing exactly
what conduct the statute prohibits.1 29 The second prong addresses
whether the statute sufficiently proscribes standards to prevent arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.1 30 Attacks against statutes similar to the
California, Pennsylvania and Florida statutes and the House Bill based on
the overbreadth doctrine should be defeated because of the statutes' and
pending legislation's explicit language prohibiting their applicability to
constitutionally protected activity.13 1
1. Void For Vagueness
For a statute to be upheld against a vagueness attack, the statute's
language must provide a "reasonable degree of certainty" in its mean-
ing.1 32 However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a stat-
125. See Robert P. Faulkner and Douglas H. Hsiao, And Where You Go I'll Fol-
low: The Constitutionality of Anti-stalking Laws and Proposed Model Legislation, 31 HARv.
J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1994) (discussing constitutionality of anti-stalking statutes).
126. JEROME A. BARRON ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
919 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing overbreadth doctrine and void for vagueness
doctrine).
127. See BARRON, supra note 126, at 119 (quoting MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYsIs 216-17 (1984)).
128. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScOr JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 11 (2d ed.
1986) (discussing requirements and rational of void for vagueness doctrine).
129. Id. For a discussion of the two prongs of the void for vagueness doctrine,
see Guy, supra note 15, at 1013.
130. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (West Supp. 1994); FIA. STAT. ch.
784.048(1) (b) (1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(e) (Supp. 1994). The Sen-
ate Bill does not expressly exclude constitutionally protected activity, and there-
fore, it may be susceptible to a constitutional attack based on the overbreadth
doctrine. See H.R. 740, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (containing exception for
constitutionally protected activity).
131. See Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952)
(holding federal statute, which included terms "so far as practicable" and "where
feasible," was not unconstitutional under void for vagueness doctrine because rea-
sonable degree of certainty doctrine satisfied); see also Gilligan, supra note 27, at
315 (discussing void for vagueness doctrine as applied to stalking statutes).
132. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (holding city
anti-noise ordinance was not unconstitutional on vagueness grounds because rea-
sonable degree of certainty standard satisfied).
14091994] COMMENT
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ute's words need not conform to mathematical certainty for the statute to
avoid being held unconstitutional on vagueness grounds.13 3 However, the
Supreme Court has also held that when a statute's language is ambiguous
and greater precision is not impossible or impractical, the statute may be
found void for vagueness. 134
a. The California Statute
The California anti-stalking statute narrows the prohibited conduct by
requiring both action and a credible threat with the intent to place the
victim in reasonable fear.1 35 The act requirement entails "willfully, mali-
ciously, and repeatedly follow[ing] or harass [ing]."136 Although the stat-
ute does not provide a meaning for "following," the word is easily defined
and certain through its common usage. 137 However, the statute defines
"harasses" broadly to include "a knowing and willful course of conduct
directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or
terrorizes the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose."138 The
words "alarms," "annoys," "torments" and "terrorizes" may appear vague,
but the statute limits the words' vagueness by requiring that the victim
suffer reasonable and actual substantial emotional distress from the
stalker's conduct.13 9
The statute defines "course of conduct" clearly, but the definition
fails to provide a time period over which the conduct must occur. 140 The
statute merely requires "a period of time, however short, evidencing a con-
tinuity of purpose."1 4 1 However, the time-frame must be left open, be-
cause if it were not, the statute would have a built-in limitation, excluding
certain short term stalking from its reach. For example, if the statute set
the time-frame at one week, a stalker who stalked a victim for only one day
would not violate the statute.
The California statute defines the term "credible threat" as "a verbal
or written threat.., made with the intent and apparent ability to carry out
the threat so as to cause ... reasonbl[e] fear."1 42 A question arises as to
133. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (holding California va-
grancy statute as unconstitutionally vague for failing to clarify what was contem-
plated by "credible and reliable").
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1994).
135. Id.
136. The definition of "follow," is "[t]o come or go after," or "[t]o move be-
hind with the intention of overtaking; pursue...." AMER cAN HERrrAGE DICTION-
ARv 320 (2d ed. 1982).
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (West Supp. 1994).
138. Id.
139. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d). For the California statute's definition
of the phrase "course of conduct," see supra note 49.
140. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (West Supp. 1994).
141. Id. § 646.9(e).
142. For a discussion of the two possible constructions of the term "intent,"
see Guy, supra note 15, at 1014.
1410 [Vol. 39: p. 1387
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whether "intent" means intent to do the act threatened or intent to cause
the victim to suffer reasonable fear. 143 However, construing the statute to
require the stalker to have the intent to do the act threatened would nul-
lify the "apparent ability" language of the statute and make the statute
extremely narrow. 144 The broader and more plausible interpretation
would require the stalker to have the intent to cause reasonable fear in the
victim and have the apparent ability to carry out the threat.14 5 Therefore,
California courts should broadly interpret the intent requirement of the
anti-stalking statute to protect victims. Thus, the California statute should
survive a void for vagueness challenge because its terms are clearly defined
and readily ascertainable.
b. The Florida Statute
The Florida statute prohibits "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follow[ing] ... another person."146 As in the California statute, the term
"following" is not defined because its meaning is presumed to be clear.
However, the terms "willful" and "malicious" may not be clear and may,
therefore, subject the statute to a void for vagueness attack. Furthermore,
this prong of the crime on its face, does not require that an intent to harm
be present. 14 7 The use of the words "willful" and "malicious" may have
been intended to incorporate an element of the offender's intent. How-
ever, after reading this part of the statute, a reasonable person may not
know exactly what conduct is prohibited and what standards will be used
to enforce the statute. Therefore, this part of the statute may be void for
vagueness.
The Florida statute also prohibits "willfully, maliciously, and repeat-
edly harass[ing] ... another person ... ."148 The statute defines the term
"harasses" as "engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific per-
son that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no
legitimate purpose." 149 This prong of the crime requires that the victim
suffer only subjective emotional distress.15 0 Consequently, the statute may
be susceptible to constitutional attack based on the term "emotional dis-
tress", because the term is not clearly defined.15 1
143. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (West Supp. 1994).
144. Id.
145. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(2) (1994). For a discussion of Florida's aggra-
vated stalking provision, see supra note 68-69 and accompanying text.
146. See FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(2). However, Florida's aggravated stalking
rovision does require an intent to place the victim in reasonable fear. See id. ch.
7.4.048( 2
147. Id. ch. 784.048(2).
148. Id. ch. 784.048(1)(a).149. Id. ch. 784.048(1)(c).
150. See id.
151. See Boychuck, supra note 5, at 789 (discussing how "reasonable person"
approach to emotional distress in stalking statutes makes statute less subjective and
less likely to be unconstitutionally vague).
25
Haas: The Formation and Viability of Anti-Stalking Laws
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The subjective nature of the term "emotional distress" may not pro-
vide sufficient notice as to what conduct the statute prohibits. 152 For ex-
ample, one person may suffer emotional distress at a point when another
person would not. On the other hand, a reasonable person-reading the
statute would probably understand the parameters of what constitutes
"emotional distress." Yet, the statute does add clarity to its definition of
"emotional distress" by requiring that the emotional distress caused by the
offenders' actions be "substantial."15 3 As a result, this provision of the
statute is not sufficiently unclear to render it void for vagueness.
Florida's aggravated stalking provision, like the California statute, also
requires a credible threat.15 4 This provision in the Florida statute should
survive a void for vagueness challenge for the same reasons discussed in
connection with the California statute. 155 According to one commenta-
tor, the aggravated stalking provision of Florida's law that punishes viola-
tions of a court-imposed order1 56 should survive a constitutional attack,
"because it is virtually identical to harassment under the Florida stalking
provision. Furthermore, the violation of the court order provides an even
stronger limit that differentiates innocent from criminal conduct."'
1 57
c. The Pennsylvania Statute
Pennsylvania's stalking statute requires a course of conduct or re-
peated acts toward another "under circumstances which demonstrate
either... an intent to place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury
... or an intent to cause substantial emotional distress to the person."' 58
The definition of "course of conduct" is substantially similar to the defini-
tion in the California statute. 159 As a result, it should survive a vagueness
challenge for the same reasons. 160
However, the phrase "repeated acts," as used in the Pennsylvania stat-
ute, may pose a vagueness problem. 16' The statute provides some gui-
152. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(2) (1994).
153. Id. ch. 784.048(3); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1994). For a
discussion of the California statute, see supra notes 45-64 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of why the California statute should survive a void for
vagueness challenge, see supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
155. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(4).
156. Guy, supra note 15, at 1019 (discussing why Florida's stalking statute is
not unconstitutionally vague under vagueness doctrine). For a discussion of the
Florida statute's harassment provision, see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying
text.
157. Guy, supra note 15, at 1019.
158. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(b) (Supp. 1994).
159. Id. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania statute's definition of "course of
conduct," see supra note 81.
160. For a discussion of why the California statute's definition of "course of
conduct" should survive a void for vagueness challenge, see supra notes 140-41 and
accompanying text.
161. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(b). The Pennsylvania statute prohibits a
course of conduct or repeated acts toward another person which indicate an intent
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dance as to the definition of the term "acts" by giving the example of
following another person without the proper authority to do so.162 This,
alone, is probably insufficient to overcome a vagueness challenge, but the
statute also requires that the action demonstrate either of two intents on
the part of the offender.1 63 The first intent, to place the person in reason-
able fear of injury, imposes an objective standard that should not be held
to be vague. The second intent, to cause substantial emotional distress to
the person, could be challenged for vagueness for the same reasons as the
Florida statute's emotional distress requirement. 164 However, the Penn-
sylvania statute defines "emotional distress" as "[a] temporary or perma-
nent state of great physical or mental strain."'165 While this definition is
broad, it may be enough to thwart a vagueness challenge.
C. The Effectiveness of the Statutes
Aside from constitutional issues, these statutes raise questions con-
cerning their effectiveness in accomplishing their purposes: to prevent
and criminalize stalking. California's requirement of a credible threat
may not provide sufficient protection for stalking victims. For example, if
a deranged man merely follows or harasses a woman but makes no threats
toward her, the stalking statute does not criminalize the stalker's behavior.
Therefore, the victim's only options to protect herself are the traditional
remedies. 166 In contrast to the California statute, the Florida statute pro-
vides a remedy for the woman who is being followed, while also providing
for an enhanced punishment if a credible threat accompanied the
stalker's actions.' 67 Therefore, a statute without a credible threat require-
ment provides more protection for victims of stalking. Future state stat-
utes will hopefully follow Florida's lead and not require a credible threat.
Pennsylvania's statute requires a showing of actions indicative of "bad
intent" on the part of the perpetrator before protection from the stalker is
triggered. 168 However, the proof required to demonstrate such intent is
unclear. A question arises as to whether the action itself could be suffi-
cient to prove the offender's ill intentions. However, the language of the
to cause that person substantial emotional distress or place that person in fear of
bodily harm. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. For a discussion of the two intents, see supra note 79 and accompany-
ing text.
164. For a discussion of the Florida statute's emotional distress requirement,
see supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
165. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(f).
166. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1994). For a discussion of
traditional civil and criminal remedies, see supra notes 21-40 and accompanying
text.
167. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048(2)-(3) (1994). For a discussion of the Florida stat-
ute, see supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
168. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(b) (Supp. 1994). For a discussion of the
Pennsylvania statute, see supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
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statute seems to indicate that more is needed. 169 If so, the Pennsylvania
statute does not criminalize stalking-type behavior until the perpetrator's
actions rise to a level indicative of ill intent. This restriction may also
cause an unnecesary limitation on the effectiveness of the statute.
D. The Proposed Model Statute
In response to questions arising under the newly formulated anti-
stalking laws, the United States Congress directed the National Institute of
Justice to develop a Model stalking law that would be both constitutional
and effective.1 70 The task force charged with developing the model stat-
ute released its proposal in September 1993.171 The proposal is scheduled
to be presented to the Attorney General for submission to Congress. 172
In the proposal, the task force defined stalking as:
" 'repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity' to some-
one, or repeatedly conveying threats by words or conduct, caus-
ing in either case 'reasonable fear' of bodily injury or death. The
stalking would have to be 'purposeful,' but it would still be a
crime if the targets were given cause to fear for their 'immediate
family' or for themselves." 173
The fear that the stalking behavior creates in the victim is the key element
of the proposed statute. 174
The proposed statute addresses some of the concerns that previous
state statutes failed to address. For example, to ensure that it would not be
subject to a constitutional attack based on vagueness, the task force used
explicit language in the proposal, such as "repeatedly maintaining a visual
or physical proximity" to the victim, in defining stalking.' 75 The proposal
also requires that the prohibited actions are accompanied by "reasonable
fear" of injury to the victim. 176 This added provision further guards
against a void for vagueness attack. The proposed statute, however, may
be subject to some of the same effectiveness concerns as the other stat-
utes. 177 For example, if a stalker instills fear in a victim without maintain-
169. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(b), (c)-(f) (Supp. 1994). For the
pertinent statutory language of this section see supra note 78.
170. S. 2922, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). For the text of Congress' directive,
see supra note 7.
171. George Lardner, Jr., Federal Task Force Suggests States Make Stalking a Felony
Offense, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1993, at A19.
172. Id. (quoting task force proposal).
173. Id.
174. Id; see also Stalking the Wild Stalker, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at A22.
175. See Lardner, supra note 170 (quoting proposal).
176. Id. (quoting proposal).
177. For a discussion of effectiveness concern, see supra notes 166-69 and ac-
companying text.
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ing physical or visual contact, the proposed statute would fail to
criminalize such behavior.
IV. CONCLUSION
Traditional remedies proved ill-suited to deal effectively with the of-
fense of stalking. 178 Therefore, states drafted statutes that dealt specifi-
cally with stalking. However, in drafting such statutes, state legislatures
encountered difficulty in balancing the need for an effective anti-stalking
statute with the requirement that the statute not be unconstitutionally
vague. Although no appellate court has yet ruled a state statute unconsti-
tutional, it may only be a matter of time before one does.
The United States Senate and House of Representatives have recog-
nized the need for a federal stalking statute and have introduced their
respective Bills.1 79 In addition, Congress has recognized the need for a
more uniform state stalking statute by directing that a model stalking stat-
ute be drafted.18 0 Stalking statutes will continue to evolve, and with the
aid of a model statute, they will likely evolve into effective and constitu-
tionally sound means of protecting stalking victims.
B. Benjamin Haas
178. For a discussion of why traditional remedies are ill suited to deal with
staking type behavior, see supra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of the House and Senate Bills, see supra notes 90-111
and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of the proposed model statute, see supra notes 170-77
and accompanying text.
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